National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity

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Virus Floats over City

National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) "is a federal advisory committee that addresses issues related to biosecurity and dual use research at the request of the United States Government."[1]

The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity's origin was a response to the 2003 report: “Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the Dual-Use Dilemma,” published by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. The report (widely known as the "Fink Report") was chaired by Gerald Fink, a biologist and director of the Whitehead Institute at MIT."[2]

Fink Report's 'Seven Deadly Sins'

The "Fink Report" "identified what it considered to be ‘experiments of concern’, or what are colloquially known as ‘the Seven Deadly Sins’: (1) demonstrating how to render a vaccine ineffective, (2) conferring resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents, (3) enhancing the virulence of a pathogen or rendering a non-pathogen virulent, (4) increasing transmissibility of a pathogen, (5) altering the host range of a pathogen, (6) enabling the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities or (7) enabling the weaponisation of a biological agent or toxin."[3]

NSABB Creation Intent

According to Kenneth Bernard during a meeting of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity held on January 23, 2020 (Timestamp 31:41 - 32:33),[4] NSABB "was not created to guard against so much the bad use of research but to make sure that the seven deadly sins did not become the standard upon which all research was measured against. So it is actually the reverse of government over-control of research...I think a lot of people forget that. The intention was to allow a deliberative process to make sure that some of those seven deadly sins...were not stopped. So it actually started off as an enabling group, not as a restrictive group."

P3 vs. Enhanced P3

Potential Pandemic Pathogens vs. Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens

David Christian Hassell (Department of Defense) explained that "Potential Pandemic Pathogens", often referred to as "P3", exist naturally while "Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens" are the product of Gain of Function research. Hassell explained that often times "P3" is used as a "euphemism" for "Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens".[5]

Members

As of May 17, 2024

From the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity website as of May 17, 2024:[6]

Chair

  • Gerald W. Parker, Jr., DVM, PhD, Associate Dean for Global One Health, College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843

Members

  • Shannon Benjamin, MS, MBA, Associate Director, Environmental Health & Safety, Ginkgo Bioworks, Boston, MA 02210
  • Kenneth Bernard, MD, RADM, U.S. Public Health Service (Retired), Former Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, Homeland Security Council, White House, Former Special Adviser for Health and Security, National Security Council, Pebble Beach, CA 93953
  • Mark R. Denison, MD, Edward Stahlman Professor of Pediatrics, Professor of Pathology, Microbiology and Immunology, Director of the Division of Pediatric Infectious Diseases, Vanderbilt University Medical Center
  • Christina Egan, PhD, Deputy Director, Division of Infectious Disease and Chief, Biodefense and Mycology Laboratories, Wadsworth Center, New York State Department of Health, Albany, NY 12208
  • Jacqueline Fletcher, PhD, Regents Professor Emerita, National Institute for Microbial Forensics and Food and Agricultural Biosecurity, Oklahoma State University, Corrales, NM 87048
  • John D. Grabenstein, RPh, PhD, President, Vaccine Dynamics, Easton, MD 21601
  • Karmella Haynes, PhD, Associate Professor, Wallace H. Coulter Department of Biomedical Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology and Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322
  • Rachel Levinson, MA, Executive Director, National Research Initiatives, Knowledge Enterprise, Arizona State University, Washington, DC 20006
  • Alex John London, PhD, Clara L. West Professor of Ethics and Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213
  • Syra Madad, DHSc, MSc, MCP, Faculty, Boston University’s Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases Policy & Research, Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Senior Director, System-wide Special Pathogens Program, NYC Health + Hospitals, New York, NY 10013
  • Dennis Metzger, PhD, Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Department of Immunology and Microbial Disease, Albany Medical College, Albany, NY 12208
  • Pamela A. Silver, PhD, Elliot T. and Onie H. Adams Professor of Biochemistry and Systems Biology, Harvard Medical School, Member, Wyss Institute of Biologically Inspired Engineering, Harvard University, Boston, MA 02115

As of 2016

From the National Institutes of Health website (archived):[7]

Inaugural Meeting

Attendees at National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity Inaugural Meeting June 30-31 2005:[8]

Committee Members

Ex Officio Agency Representatives

NIH Representatives

Dangerous Research

On December 20, 2011, the National Institutes of Health published a Press Release[9] addressing controversial H5N1 research, assuring the public that the [Gain of Function] research is necessary and measures are in place to mitigate misuse [by terrorists] of findings.

As summarized by AI:

"The US is concerned about both seasonal influenza and potential pandemics. While avian influenza (H5N1) rarely infects humans now, scientists worry it could mutate and become highly transmissible. Research is crucial to prepare for this possibility, but some details could be misused. A committee reviewed unpublished research on H5N1 transmission and recommended redacting specific methods while allowing publication of the overall findings. The US is working on secure access to such details for qualified researchers and developing a policy to oversee research with potential for misuse."

Excerpt of Press Release:

"Currently, H5N1 avian influenza virus — the strain commonly referred to as "bird flu" — rarely infects humans and does not spread easily from person to person. However, many scientists and public health officials are concerned that the virus could evolve in nature into a form that is transmissible among humans — an event that could potentially make this deadly virus an extremely serious global public health threat. Thus research on factors that can affect the transmissibility of the H5N1 virus is critically important to international efforts to prepare and prevent threats to public health.
While the public health benefits of such research can be important, certain information obtained through such studies has the potential to be misused for harmful purposes. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) — an independent expert committee that advises the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other Federal departments and agencies on matters of biosecurity — completed a review of two unpublished manuscripts describing NIH-funded research on the transmissibility of H5N1. These manuscripts — which describe laboratory experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility in mammals – concluded that the H5N1 virus has greater potential than previously believed to gain a dangerous capacity to be transmitted among mammals, including perhaps humans, and describe some of the genetic changes that appear to correlate with this potential.
Following its review, the NSABB decided to recommend that HHS ask the authors of the reports and the editors of the journals that were considering publishing the reports to make changes in the manuscripts. Due to the importance of the findings to the public health and research communities, the NSABB recommended that the general conclusions highlighting the novel outcome be published, but that the manuscripts not include the methodological and other details that could enable replication of the experiments by those who would seek to do harm.
The NSABB also recommended that language be added to the manuscripts to explain better the goals and potential public health benefits of the research, and to detail the extensive safety and security measures taken to protect laboratory workers and the public.

References

  1. ↑ About (accessed May 17, 2024)
  2. ↑ National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity Summary of Inaugural Meeting June 30-31 2005 (accessed May 17, 2024)
  3. ↑ Issues in Biosecurity and Biosafety (accessed May 17, 2024)
  4. ↑ National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity Meeting held on January 23, 2020 (accessed May 17, 2024)
  5. ↑ (Timestamp 37:22 - 37:46) National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity Meeting held on January 23, 2020 (accessed May 17, 2024)
  6. ↑ Roster of Voting Members (accessed May 17, 2024)
  7. ↑ NSABB Voting Members (accessed May 17, 2024)
  8. ↑ National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity Summary of Inaugural Meeting June 30-31 2005 (accessed May 17, 2024)
  9. ↑ Press Statement on the NSABB Review of H5N1 Research (accessed May 17, 2024)
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